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The Risky Business of Doctoral
Management
Erica McWilliama*, Don Sandersona, Terry Evansb,
Alan Lawsonc and Peter G. Taylora
aQueensland University of Technology, Australia; bDeakin University, Geelong, Australia;
cUniversity of Queensland, Australia
Universities are under no less pressure to adopt risk management strategies than other public and
private organisations. The risk management of doctoral education is a particularly important issue
given that a doctorate is the highest academic qualification a university offers and stakes are high in
terms of assuring its quality. However, intense risk management can interfere with the intellectual
and pedagogical work which are essentially part of doctoral education. This paper seeks to
understand how the culture of risk meets the culture of doctoral education and with what effect. The
authors draw on sociological understandings of risk in the work of Anthony Giddens (2002) and
Ulrich Beck (1992), the anthropological focus on liminality in the work of Mary Douglas (1990),
and the psychological theorising of human error in the work of James Reason (1990). The paper
concludes that risk consciousness brings its own risks—in particular, the potential transformation of
a culture based on intellect into a culture based on compliance.
Introduction
The concept of risk as a phenomenon that needs to be professionally managed
has become an increasing concern for a burgeoning number of organisations.
All managers, whether they come from bureaucracies or biscuit factories, are now part
of a new “attentional economy” (Taylor, 2005) that focuses squarely on risk.
Ironically, while risk management is defined as an invitation to take risks and mitigate
them, the collapse of risk management into risk avoidance is all too easy when public
money needs to be accounted for and when reputations can be so quickly destabilised.
It iswithout a doubt that riskmanagement is serious business in the higher education
sector. At the time this paper was written, a Google search revealed 8.8million sources
relevant to the term “university scandal”. An edited list of approximately half a million
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reports included different Western universities which were involved in allegations of
fraud (cheating, bogus degrees, bogus testing, plagiarism), low literacy levels, sexual
misconduct, doubts about research integrity, unfairness or abuse of process (such as
bullying), and financial mismanagement (including bribery).
Most of these allegations implicated students from thedoctoral program.As a degree
that is universally regarded as a “flagship” qualification, doctorates aremore vulnerable
to the fall-out when claims of this type enter the public arena (seeMcWilliam, Lawson,
Evans, & Taylor, 2005). Doctoral students or academic staff who become
“whistleblowers” and allege the misconduct of supervisors or fellow academics
(e.g. see Griffiths & Hackett, 2005; Noonan & Thompson, 2003) can quickly
undermine the reputation of a school’s faculty. On the other hand, individuals
who falsely claim a doctorate (e.g. see Dullroy, 2004) can also affect a university’s
reputation. This kind of damage is usually deeply felt and lingers for an uncomfortable
duration.
It was only recently that universities began to develop and maintain the formal risk
management protocols used by many other sectors in public life. This was largely pre-
emptedbydiscussions amongAustralian bureaucratMichaelGallagher, theAustralian
federal government’s Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs, and
senior university executives. According to Gallagher (2000), these discussions drew
attention to “a number of failures” linked to the “trial and error dimension” of
university management practice. Therefore, he declared that the “the next phase of
development... [will] be more formalized and professionally risk managed” (p. 38).
Since then, the doctorate—as the highest educational qualification offered by
universities—has become the highest stakes program in terms of risk. Allegations of low
standards, wastefulness, or unprofessional practice are more worrisome when they
involve the doctorate. “Suspect” practices are easily attributed to a suspect doctorate
and this can affect a university’s reputation and the credibility of the higher education
sector as a whole. As a result, the risk management of doctorates has become
“a collective, organizational issue” (Delamont,Atkinson,&Parry, 1997, p. 322) instead
of just the individual judgements and behaviours of academics as disciplinary gurus.
In this paper, we highlight the issue of how risk management can be both important
and problematic for doctoral education. This means that while risk management
helps maintain the university’s reputation and financial accountabilities, it can also
overwhelm the creativity and risk taking in students’ research. When this happens, the
risk management of doctoral programs simply turns into risk avoidance. Therefore,
universities must understand the importance of maintaining high ethical, academic
and financial standards while supporting experimentation with content, format,
methodology, and pedagogy. In Australia, we have already seen the collapse of
“alternative” doctoral programs due to tough requirements that retain almost all the
hallmarks of a traditional PhD while adding more alternative work at the same time
(see McWilliam et al., 2002). If risk avoidance was all that was valued in risk
management, this would affect the university’s research output, given that doctoral
programs are key sites in the production of new knowledge. Therefore, it is crucial
that we explore the growing nexus between risk management and doctoral education
210 E. McWilliam et al.
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
De
ak
in
 U
ni
ve
rs
it
y]
 A
t:
 0
1:
12
 1
4 
Ma
y 
20
10
to ascertain how doctorates are at risk from risk management itself. Are doctorates in
danger of being screwed down too tightly by organisational mechanisms of
compliance? How will we know when this happens?
We explore this issue through an account of the important processes that our
research1 has identified in the current risk management of doctoral education in
Australia. We draw together a new conceptual architecture that combines several
disciplinary terrains, each of which is useful for understanding risk management of
doctorates in terms of its process. Specifically, we make use of the sociological
understandings of risk in the work of Anthony Giddens (2002) and Ulrich Beck
(1992), the anthropological focus on liminality in the work of Mary Douglas (1990)
and others who have applied her theory, and the psychological theorising of human
error in the work of James Reason (1990). While we understand the epistemological
dangers in converging different disciplinary frameworks, we have nevertheless
identified a confluence that can provide a way to understand risk as a phenomenon
that occurs throughout the risk management of doctorates.
This paper proceeds through a number of steps. First, we outline contemporary
imperatives to risk management and their social antecedents. Then, we consider the
problems that occur when there is a failure of risk management processes within the
academy. Doctoral risk mitigation—as a subset of risk management—is then discussed
through Reason’s (1990) lens of human error minimisation. Based on this work and
our own research, we develop an adapted model that shows how doctoral risks are
mitigated by guarding against future troublesome events and protecting the university
against issues that can damage its reputation. Finally, we consider what might be lost
to intellectual culture if risk avoidance were to overwhelm scholarship or the pursuit of
that which is original and unknown.
Risk as an Organisational Logic
There was a time when the idea of risk management practice in doctoral education
was considered odd and even ludicrous. This was because risk management, with its
long-term association with financial practices in the private sector, had little to do with
the erudite, unworldly practices of academic induction. Indeed, even the term,
doctoral education, is relatively new to the academy. It marks the recent imperative to
shift from an intimate, monastic pedagogy conducted in private offices and
laboratories to a more public and accountable set of practices and performances
which involve the university, supervisors, and the supervised.
Just as risk management is a recent import to university processes, the idea of risk or
“hazards that are actively assessed in relation to future possibilities” (Giddens, 2002,
p. 22) is itself a recent phenomenon in Western culture. According to Giddens, risk is
an idea only apprehensible for a society living “after the end of nature” or the time
after magic, cosmology, and the fates gave way to scientific calculation and insurance
(2002, p. 27). Today, risk demands attention to what can go wrong and enough
planning to guard against such a possibility. It depends not only upon the
identification of risks but also the calculability of risk factors and the risk events that
Risky Business 211
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
De
ak
in
 U
ni
ve
rs
it
y]
 A
t:
 0
1:
12
 1
4 
Ma
y 
20
10
may follow. This makes the notion of performance in a risk society very much focused
on danger—in particular, the danger of failing to perform in ways that are morally,
politically, and organisationally acceptable (Giddens, 2002).
Giddens’swork (2002) parallels that ofUlrichBeck (1992),who states that risk shifts
attention away from themanagement anddistribution ofmaterial or industrial “goods”
to themanagement and distribution of “bads”. This includes the control of knowledge
about danger and the systems needed to mitigate this danger. For Beck (1992), a risk
society is not a replacement for industrial society. Rather, it is characterised by a
qualitative change in the perception of the social order of things. He draws attention to
the complexity of this neworder’s cultural dynamics, focusing in particular on the logic
through which those dynamics are communicated. For Beck (1992), this distributive
logic implicates everyone in a globalweb of risk technologies, where allmatterswith the
potential to generate risk and hazards must be visible and quantifiable.
The anthropological work of Mary Douglas (1990) also understands the tendency
for risk to be focused on averting disaster. Her anthropological analyses across a range
of cultures show how a risk society shifts attention from the concept of risk as the
probability of losses and gains, to the idea that it simply means danger. She states:
The modern risk concept, parsed now as danger, is invoked to protect individuals against
encroachments of others. It is part of the system of thought that upholds the type of
individualist culture that sustains an expanding industrial system. (1990, p. 7)
Similarly, cultural theorists define the concept of risk-as-danger as something that
serves forensic needs by “politicizing and moralizing the links between dangers and
approved behaviours” of a new and expanding global culture (Pidgeon, Hood, Jones,
Turner, & Gibson, 1992, p. 113). As a result, good behaviour comes to be defined as
that which mobilises the eradication or minimisation of risk. In publicly funded
academic institutions, good behaviour mitigates danger in the form of wasted
resources, a decline of standards, student failure, political lampooning, and the like.
This politicising and moralising work has its own constitutive logic. As Giddens
(2002) puts it, risk gives rise to “a new moral climate... marked by a push and pull
between accusations of scaremongering on the one hand and cover-ups on the other”
(p. 29). This push and pull dynamic is evident both within and beyond universities, as
in any other domain of social and organisational life. It comes in the form of claims
and counter-claims that, taken together, determine whether particular matters are
considered more or less “risky” or whether certain individuals or classes of people are
more or less “at risk”.
Amid this rising cacophony, none of us can be sure “when we are actually
scaremongering and when we are not” (Giddens, 2002, p. 31). When this happens,
statistics can then be mobilised to “confirm” both the accusations of scaremongering
and cover-up. At the same time, anecdotal evidencemay also be included to support or
refute claim and counter-claim while resulting “scandals” will need to be ameliorated,
defended, or refuted. This shows how shoring up the organisation against such
allegations has become a major task of working life.
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Recent moves to audit research are clear evidence of how the imperative to mitigate
risk is being applied to public funding of universities. It indicates a move from
mission-based funding to performance indicator-based funding, and eventually, to a
mixed model in which peer reviews mitigate the risk of manipulating outcomes
in a purely performance indicator-based system. Examples include the
United Kingdom’s Research Assessment Exercise (RAE), which was introduced in
1986 in order to assess the quality and impact of research in the country. This was
followed by Hong Kong (modified RAE, 1993) and New Zealand (Performance
Based Research Fund), which also adopted systems of research accounting that apply
expert review to performance indicator metrics. Currently, Australia is also moving
towards its own version of research audit, the Research Quality Framework (RQF).
While it comes with the most benign of epithets (seeking to identify and reward
“quality”), research is audited based on logic which is doubly negative. It mainly seeks
to prevent the possibility of things going wrong and defines research as a publicly
funded activity that has repercussions for the nation’s reputation and economic status.
On the part of post-welfare governments, this logic builds on more than a decade of
concern about the “value for money”. In the mid-90s, both the Higher Education
Management Review Committee in Australia (Hoare, Stanley, Kirkby, & Coaldrake,
1995) and the Dearing Report (1997) in the United Kingdom emphasised the failure
of universities to develop a management culture necessary to self-regulation in
relation to organisational performance. Given the cost of higher education and
research, current policy shifts to audit research quality follow a more long-term
government demand for risk management in the form of waste identification and
eradication. Alan Lawson (1999) elaborates thus:
Because higher education is valued, it is potentially a commodity. But it is only a
commodity worth paying for if it can be made to seem scarce. Once it is scarce it can be
competed for, accounted for, and subjected to audits that will inevitably disclose how
those scarce resources are being wasted... higher degree education... has been redefined
as a ‘scarce’ commodity which we can ill-afford to ‘waste’. (p. 11)
Lawson (1999) goes on to argue that in higher degree research in Australia,
conflations of postgraduate student data relating to attrition and completion rates
have been deployed to render the sector more vulnerable to accusations of waste. He
expresses concerns that accusations, once made, will continually reinforce anecdotal
claims about the irrelevance of such higher degree study and employer dissatisfaction
with higher degree graduates. The topos that best captures this is that of “the taxi-
driving PhD graduate”—an urban legend that had circulated the United States for
years and was cited by Maresi Nerad and Joseph Cerny (1999) as one of the
motivations for their landmark study, “PhDs: Ten Years Later”. This study surveyed
over 6,000 PhD graduates of 61 U.S. PhD-granting universities from 1996–1997.
Although Nerad and Cerny (1999) failed to find a single taxi-driving PhD graduate,
the myth was confidently repeated by an academic commentator on a recent episode
of ABC Radio National’s Counterpoint program (Duffy, 2005).
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Given such claims about postgraduate studies, it is almost inevitable that measures
of efficiency come to take the place of measures of quality. This is demonstrated by a
very recent report into higher education by ex-Premier Robert Rae for the Canadian
province of Ontario. Here, Rae (2005) calls on the government to “expand graduate
enrolment at those institutions that can demonstrate quality and a capacity to provide
the necessary supports to students to ensure the successful and timely completion of
their studies” (p. 87). This recommendation implies that resources are inefficiently
being deployed by some institutions, students, and academics. Rae is more explicit in
his later statements when he says that, “universities can strive to do a better job of
ensuring that graduate degrees are completed in a timely fashion. Graduate students
and their teachers need to take this job seriously” (2005, p. 10). The way is thus
prepared for an audit of the performance and efficiency of higher education programs.
Drawing attention to the issue of what counts as risk well managed or risk yet-to-be-
managed, Lawson (1999) flags the push and pull factors that characterise debates
regarding the “true” indicators of research quality and who the arbiters of such quality
should be. In other words, the issue of quality has become a point around which
academics, government bureaucrats, and politicians struggle to articulate what ought
to count as true (the validity and reliability of indicators), what can or is available to be
counted, what the various proxies might actually measure, and who ought to be doing
the counting.
Risk as an Event
While this push and pull is characterises the macro-climate of policy making and
policy response, the forensic work of danger mitigation increasingly occupies the time
and attention of academics and general staff who implement the policies and
programs within the universities.
Risk management requires constant vigilance to ensure that this aspect of the
university’s managerial house is in order. Kasperson et al. (1998) provide a
conceptual model of “the social amplification of risk” that is helpful in understanding
what the university—as a publicly accountable, collective organisation—is on guard
against. Working from the assumption that the investigation of risk is both “a scientific
activity and an expression of culture”, Kasperson et al. explain how an apparently
minor risk might produce massive public reactions (1998, p. 149). In particular, the
term risk event is used to describe “occurrences that are manifestations of the risk and
that initiate signals pertaining to the risk”. A risk event is usually “specific to a
particular time and location” but comes to “interact with psychological, social and
cultural processes” in ways that “heighten or attenuate public perceptions of risk and
related risk behaviour” (Kasperson et al., 1998, p. 150). Any allegation of less than
exemplary practice gains the status of a risk event when it interacts with other
sociocultural processes to produce new behaviours that serve to increase the perceived
danger. This triggers demands for “additional organisational response and protective
actions or impeding needed protective actions” (Kasperson et al., 1998, p. 151).
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In other words, the process of risk loops back upon itself, proliferating the actions and
reactions that constitute its management.
The accusation that a particular doctorate might be “silly, soft and otherwise
suspect” (McWilliam et al., 2005, p. 214) is considered neither a true (absolute) nor a
distorted (socially determined) risk within the academy. However, the accusation—
whatever its origins may be—mobilises activity that is potentially dangerous to a
particular university and the higher education sector. This is not to say that there may
be no basis to the claims made in a particular case. It is merely argued that an
accusation arising at a certain time and place can do a particular kind of work in
governing academic practices. When there is an alleged instance of poor quality, waste
of resources, or inappropriate conduct, a whole organisational culture is already
mobilised by the naming of this occurrence. It is now a risk event.
A risk event signals that the practices meant to guard against risk have failed. There
is, as it were, a secondary loss of reputation. Not only has the institution failed in a task
of academic judgement, it has also failed in its institutional obligation to manage risk.
There are two things that need to happen: the incident needs to be responded to
urgently and publicly and the means by which risk escaped the institution must be
addressed internally. It is also crucial that the institution reassess and reapplies its
strategies for risk mitigation to make sure that a similar allegation will not happen
again.
A Model of Risk Mitigation
James Reason’s bookHuman Error (1990) provides an insight into risk mitigation that
can be applied to higher education and doctoral education. Reason (1990) draws on a
number of catastrophic human error events (e.g. Bhopal, Challenger, Chernobyl, and
the Kings Cross underground fire) to develop a conceptual model of risk mitigation as
a cascade of error in a complex network of systems. Using the negative logic that is
characteristic of analyses of risk, Reason (1990) represents the dynamics of accident
causation through the Swiss Cheese model (see Figure 1), portrayed in military
terminology as a trajectory of accident “opportunity penetrating several defensive
systems” (p. 208). These defensive systems, vigilant as they are against danger,
inherently contain “local triggers, intrinsic defects, and atypical conditions” (p. 208).
Reason’s (1990) model highlights the risk factors that are part of the operational and
managerial make-up of the defensive system.
Reason (1990) offers his framework as an aetiology of incidents in complex systems
in order to indicate where risk management measures could be applied. According to
him, the basic elements of production in risk management’s war on danger are the
decision makers, the line management, preconditions, productive activities, and defences.
Within these are the human elements of incident causation (see Table 1).
Reason (1990) argues that no system is free of failure because “holes” are always
present in each “slice” of defensive systems. He argues that errors are “the inevitable
and usually acceptable price human beings have to pay for their remarkable ability to
cope with very difficult informational tasks quickly and... effectively” (p. 148).
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He also identifies two types of human error responsible for the actualisation of an
incident: latent and active errors. Active errors are visible and therefore tend to be the
focus of accident investigators. There is also apparent ease in their eradication—as
seen through the “name, blame, and shame” organisational syndrome. Active errors
are usually perpetrated by front-line operators such as aircraft pilots and console
operators. Today, this list includes academics as well.
In contrast to active errors, most latent errors have eluded scrutiny—lying dormant
within a system, waiting for the right conditions to occur before being made visible
(Reason, 1990). These errors are perpetrated by individuals with no direct link to an
incident, such as designers and high-level decision makers. Reason believes that “the
more removed individuals are from these front-line activities... the greater is their
potential danger to the system” (1990, p. 174).
Therefore, the tendency for risk management to aim largely at the active end of the
incident trajectory is merely hitting the tip of the iceberg. One must move the focus
from the “sharp end” of the incident to the “blunt end” in order to shift the “name,
blame, and shame” organisational mentality to a more holistic and systemic search for
incident causation (Reason, 1990).
While it may be absurd to suggest that a risk event involving doctorates would be as
catastrophic as Chernobyl, the basic elements of the risk management process that
Reason (1990) points out can also be used in understanding how universities are risk
managing higher degree policies and programs. Our study of three public universities
and one private university in Australia indicates that the public universities have
similar strategies for higher degree risk management.2 These include having high-level
plans that cascade down to specific line management responsibilities, paying attention
to certain pre-conditions for “delivering” doctoral education, and using pedagogical
processes that combine human and technological elements. Most importantly, all
three public universities have clear policies and responsibilities in relation to risk
(see Table 2).
Figure 1. The “Swiss cheese” model of human error causation (adapted from Reason, 1990)
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Table 1. Basic elements of production integrated with human elements of accident causation
Basic elements
of production Decision makers Line management Preconditions Productive activities Defences
Examples Plant and corporate
management
Departmental specialists,
operations, sales,
training, finance,
personnel, etc.
Reliable technologies,
equipment, skilled
and motivated,
knowledgeable
workforce,
environmental
conditions,
timetables, etc.
Integration of human
and technological
elements
Risk mitigation
plans
Human
elements of
accident
causation
Fallible decisions Line management
deficiencies
Psychological
precursors
of unsafe acts
Unsafe acts Inadequate
defences
Example Decisions are based on
the balance between
safety goals and
production goals
and are contingent
upon finite resources
Poor scheduling, poor
procedures, deficiencies
in skills, rules or
knowledge, and
maintenance
Failing to wear safety
equipment, stress,
failing to perceive
hazards, being
imperfectly aware
of the system,
inadequacies, poor
motivation,
psychological effects
An error or violation
committed in the
presence of a potential
hazard, e.g. failure to
wear a safety helmet
Personal safety
equipment,
automatic
safety devices
Error
classification
Latent Latent Latent Active Active and latent
R
isk
y
B
u
sin
ess
2
1
7
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
B
y
:
 
[
D
e
a
k
i
n
 
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
]
 
A
t
:
 
0
1
:
1
2
 
1
4
 
M
a
y
 
2
0
1
0
Table 2. Reason’s (1990) model adapted to show doctoral risk mitigation in three public universities in Australia
Basic elements
of production Decision makers Line management Pre-conditions Productive activities Defences
Examples High-level plans
for research and
research training
A central system that
coordinates the
implementation of
research training plans
across the university;
faculties and departments
that provide resources,
disciplinary expertise,
and manage workloads
Divisions that resource
and support Resources
for Human Development
by way of library services,
ICTs, other technologies,
space, and related
services
Pedagogical activity
that integrates
human and
technological
elements.
Public milestone
events using
formal
documentation
processes
Risk management
plans. Formal
reviews of
candidature.
Health and safety
plans. Research
ethics
committees.
Appeals
committees
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The risk mitigation processes within these three publicly funded universities
indicate that they have all understood the importance of instituting processes and
policies that are well aligned across the organisation. At the same time, responsibilities
are clearly attached to particular individuals and groups of individuals to ensure
compliance with those policies. There is also little evidence of the trial and error logic
of which Gallagher (2000) was so critical at the turn of the millennium. Indeed, it is
remarkable, given the bulwark of defences against risk, that doctoral matters still
escape such universities to become amplified as risk events. We adapted Reason’s
(1990) model to suggest how this might occur (see Table 3).
In order to understand how risk mitigation failure can be translated in terms of
doctoral education management, we discuss how one of the three public universities
in our study managed a recent problem involving the examiners of a particular
doctoral thesis. Apparently, the examiners’ reports were so brief that questions were
raised as to whether they were adequate enough to be considered rigorous evaluations
of doctoral work.
This problem arose despite the processual layers designed to “filter out” the risk in
advance and efforts to ensure that examiners were suitably qualified and informed of
university guidelines for doctoral thesis assessment. In Table 4, we map the process
utilised by the university in handling this problem and the risk management
components which one can broadly recognise across the higher education sector.
Initially, it may be hard to see how the failure occurred despite the university’s best
efforts to vet suitable examiners and to ensure that their credentials and experience
were acceptable. After all, an academic manager had checked the examiners’
background at the faculty level and paperwork was promptly and efficiently dealt with
using the university’s approved documentation. At the same time, the academics who
supervised the doctoral work had a sound record of helping doctoral students to
achieve successful completions.
However, holes in the process became apparent when the examiners failed to
produce a rigorous and comprehensive report that would enable the university
committee to reach a decision about the quality of the thesis and the recommendation
that should be made.
In response to this problem, the university reviewed the processes involved in this
case in order to understand how the failure could have occurred. There are several
responses that can be made. The first is a system response, which demands a more
rigorous line management of the processes within the university. In this case, however,
it was only the examiners’ actual performance that escaped the risk management
processes. The university had carried out an appropriate assessment of their academic
and examining experience and could not have disclosed such a risk.
Another way of dealing with the problem is the risk mitigation response, where the
university can prepare safeguards against future misunderstanding of the scope and
rigour of examiners’ written reports. This is seen in the way the Australian Council of
Deans and Directors of Graduate Studies (the Council) (2005) prepared a consensual
set of guidelines for managing doctoral examinations:
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Table 3. Risk mitigation failure in the processes of doctoral management
Human elements
of accident
causation Fallible decisions
Line management
deficiencies
Psychological
precursors of
unsafe acts Unsafe acts
Inadequate
defences
Example Decisions are
narrowly based
on achieving
closure around
individual cases.
Short reach of
academic
management
into supervisor/
student relationship
Time poverty; inadequate
reviewing processes;
lack of supervisor
expertise; lack of
examiner expertise;
failure to understand,
implement, or update
policies and procedures;
inadequate estimation
of and planning for
ongoing resource
provision; inadequate
planning for ongoing
supervision
Failure of student
and/or supervisor
to perceive the
nature and/or
scope of the
project; being
imperfectly aware
of the system;
personal time and
family constraints;
intercultural
misunderstandings;
non-traditional
research focus/
topics
Inappropriate
interpersonal
conduct; public
disclosure of
inadequate
supervisory
practice or
research product;
plagiarism and
other fraudulent
activity; error in
the presence of a
potential hazard,
e.g. research
involving volatile
chemicals
Defensiveness as the
only response
protocol. Failure
to coordinate
timely media
responses.
“Academic freedom”
used as an excuse
for aberrant
conduct or
inadequate
processes. Buck
passing
Error
classification
Latent Latent Latent Active Active and latent
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Table 4. Risk mitigation failure in examination reporting
Human elements
of accident
causation
Fallible
decisions
Line management
deficiencies
Psychological
precursors of
unsafe acts Unsafe acts Inadequate defences
Inadequate
doctoral
reporting
Examiners
approved
according
to the
university’s
guidelines
Supervisors proposed
examiners; faculty-level
approval based on
assessment of
qualifications and
experience of
examiners’
curricula vitae
Presumption that
examiners assessed
as appropriately
qualified and
experienced
would deliver
quality reports.
All examiners of the
same thesis produce
a poor-quality report
Activating a new or
further examination
process would mean
delay unacceptable
to the student; difficult
to justify because the
examiners were
unanimous in their
praise of the particular
thesis
Error classification Latent Latent Latent Active Active and latent
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In developing these Guidelines, the Council seeks to guide best practice. It believes that
greater commonality in practice among Australian universities will lead to greater clarity
in the minds—and hence the recommendations—of examiners; and a greater assurance
to candidates, examiners, the public, government and other funding bodies, and
employers that the highest standards are maintained across the sector. (2005, p. 1)
These Guidelines are publicly accessible on the Council’s web site and explain the
purpose of examiners’ reports and how universities (and candidates) should make use
of them. In particular, the Council states that:
Each examiner’s report must be sufficiently detailed and comprehensive to fulfil both the
summative and formative objectives of the thesis examination. A report that is shorter
than 2 pages is unlikely to serve these purposes. The report should discuss both the
strengths and the weaknesses of the thesis. (Australian Council of Deans and Directors of
Graduate Studies, 2005, p. 1)
On the other hand, a risk avoidance response requires a more stringent set of
guidelines so that examiners can prepare their reports using templates and a common
set of assessment criteria deemed appropriate to the task. If one were to take this
further and apply it at a national level (in an expanded RQF, for example), a body
similar to the Australian Universities Quality Agency must be formed to oversee
quality through a single set of criteria. However, Holbrook, Bourke, Lovat, and Dally
(2004) counsel against this by arguing that:
to affix thesis assessment too hard to specific criteria, may eventuate in the loss of some
very important qualities, possibly those linked to higher order thinking. Supervisors and
examiners utilise language that indicates that they can both ‘feel’ and articulate when a
thesis demonstrates the appropriate combination of qualities. (p. 16)
It is worth noting that the likelihood of more than one examiner providing an
inadequate report on the same thesis at the same time is very slim. Based on
large-scale studies into doctoral reporting by the University of Newcastle Centre
for the Study of Research Training and Impact, the current Australian “multiple
reporting mechanism proves to be extremely robust in facilitating the achievement
of equitable outcomes” (Holbrook et al., 2004, p. 16).
Indeed, a study done on 1,102 doctoral examination reports written for 401 theses
papers from four universities revealed that discrepant recommendations from
examiners occurred in only 3% of cases (Holbrook et al., 2004). Holbrook et al. also
found strong evidence of the university’s capacity to make appropriate judgements
when two or more reports did not align in terms of the summary recommendation
made. In simple terms, this study indicates that doctoral thesis examination is an
example of remarkably efficient risk management (Holbrook et al., 2004).
Therefore, it is important to resist the imposition of a narrow compliance regime on
the doctoral examination process.This has to dowith the richness of the diversity of the
reports themselves. Put simply, such richness and diversity may be put at risk by a
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compliance regime that undervalues academic judgement and invests in hyper-rational
systems of audit. The work of Holbrook et al. (2004) and Mullins and Kiley (2002)
shows that doctoral examiners approach the business of writing reports in a wide range
of ways, working out of diverse genres, forms of address, and scholarly exchange. Some
reports are quite personal,with the examiner’s comments addressed explicitly fromone
individual scholar to another.Thesemayallude to thepersonal andprofessional history
of the examiner and provide some broader observations and reflections beyond the
parameters of the thesis itself. Other examiners give predominant attention to how the
doctoral research is located in a larger field of scholarship while some commend or
question the supervision. There are also scholars who like to give precise suggestions
about publication or other further work. All this scholarly writing constitutes a rich and
diverse field of academic literature. It is important to acknowledge that the examiner
report is a key element in understanding doctoral examination as intellectual work.
The current trend towards the quantification of quality in and of public universities
in Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, and the UK is not heartening in this respect.
It is likely that more compliance will be demanded from publicly funded universities,3
with greater penalties for any failure to show that risks are being minimised, including
those that pertain to higher degree research. The judgements we make in the process
of risk managing our doctorates ought to lead to more effective academic managerial
practice andmore rigorous scholarly practice, not set one imperative against the other.
Notes
1. This draws on findings from an ARC Large Grant Project (2004–06) entitled “The Impact of
Risk Management on Higher Degree Research Policy and Pedagogy in Australian Universities”.
2. The private university in the study has at this time a very limited involvement with higher degree
research and few risk management strategies in place that relate to higher degree research. Their
risk management planning is squarely focused on financial risk. Recent Australian Universities
Quality Agency feedback has identified the need for this gap to be filled in that organisation.
3. It is worth noting that the Act that now regulates the conditions of university funding is called
The Higher Education Support Act (2003); its predecessor was the Higher Education Funding
Act (1988).
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